The CVE-2026-35536 fix added a validation loop that rejects [\x00-\x20\x3b\x7f], but only for the
hardcoded lowercase keys name/domain/path/samesite. The still-live deprecated **kwargs path
writes attacker-supplied attribute values straight into the Morsel with no validation, and because
Morsel.__setitem__ is case-insensitive, a capitalized kwarg (Domain=, Path=, SameSite=, Max-Age=)
routes to the same reserved attribute while bypassing the loop — re-opening ;-delimited attribute injection.
self.set_cookie("sid", "abc", Domain="evil.com; Secure; SameSite=None")
# -> Set-Cookie: sid=abc; Domain=evil.com; Secure; SameSite=None; Path=/
# Sanity (the canonical lowercase named arg IS blocked):
self.set_cookie("sid", "abc", domain="evil.com; Secure") # -> http.cookies.CookieError
The patch's regression test (SetCookieForbiddenCharHandler) only exercises the four named params, never the
**kwargs path, so the gap is not regression-covered.
tornado/web.py → RequestHandler.set_cookie: the validation loop covers only the lowercase named args;
the trailing if kwargs: loop does morsel[k] = v with no character validation.GET /upper (uses Domain= kwarg) emits Set-Cookie: c_upper=v; Domain=evil.com; Secure; SameSite=None; Path=/; GET /lower (uses lowercase
domain=) returns a CookieError.
Injection of independent cookie attributes (force/drop Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite, rebind Domain/Path)
— the same impact CVE-2026-35536 closed, via the sibling path the patch missed. Conditional on the app using
a capitalized/legacy keyword.
Apply the same [\x00-\x20\x3b\x7f] validation to every entry in the **kwargs loop (after normalizing the
key case), or remove the deprecated kwargs path; add a regression test for capitalized kwargs.
Reported as part of an incomplete-patch measurement study (responsible disclosure).
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-01T20:17:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
}