AZL-115642

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Import Source
https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-115642.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/AZL-115642
Upstream
Published
2026-11-20T06:18:13Z
Modified
2026-11-21T14:17:24Z
Summary
CVE-2026-99751 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()

The issue: This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric. After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().

__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking only that mac_header < network_header. Nothing verifies that the MAC header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the redirect goes on to read is linear either.

A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:

bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);
bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);

after vlan pop_eth. The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb->len < skb->data_len BUG in __skb_pull():

kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!
RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50
Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -> packet_xmit -> packet_sendmsg
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC header is gone. On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0 after the pull, so the network header sits at skb->tail and the route lookup reads ip4h->protocol, ip4h->saddr and ip4h->daddr past the linear area.

The Fix: Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of skb->mac_len. mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit packets, while the span still rejects the one-byte header produced by pop_eth + bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0). The single check also covers the mac_header >= network_header test it replaces.

Use pskb_may_pull() to make the Ethernet header linear before it is read or pulled, and to make the IP header linear in both the v4 and the v6 path before ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() is read. The header pointers are taken after the pull, since pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb->head.

Conditions to recreate the bug: On x86-64 with 4 KiB pages, enable CONFIG_PACKET, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL, CONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS, CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL, CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN and CONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF. Run as root with BPF loading, network administration and raw-packet privileges. Bring lo up and attach a SCHED_ACT program that calls bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0), then returns bpf_redirect_neigh(skb->ifindex, NULL, 0, 0):

ip link set lo up tc qdisc add dev lo clsact tc filter add dev lo egress matchall action vlan pop_eth pipe
action bpf object-file neigh_chghead.o section action

Send an untagged ETH_P_IP frame of ETH_HLEN + 8192 bytes through an AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW socket bound to lo, without PACKET_VNET_HDR or PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS. Use a unicast destination MAC. The sender's skb has a 14-byte linear Ethernet prefix and a fragmented payload; pop_eth removes that prefix and change_head restores only one linear byte. The unfixed neighbor redirect then tries to pull 14 bytes and BUGs.

Sending the same frame without pop_eth and change_head leaves the IP header in the frags, which is the route lookup reading past skb->tail.

References

Affected packages

Azure Linux:3 / kernel

Package

Name
kernel
Purl
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Last Affected
6.6.161.1-1

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-115642.json"