AZL-85386

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl

buildsecdesc() and idmodetocifsacl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor.

The original fix only checked that the struct smbacl header fits before reading daclptr->size or daclptr->numaces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.

A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replacesidsandcopyaces() or setchmoddacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.

Factor the DACL structural checks into validatedacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parsedacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.