AZL-89064

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tgptgpmembersshow()

targettgptgpmembersshow() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a 256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() curlen bytes from that buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs reader, which when CONFIGFORTIFYSOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic() will be triggered.

Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: targetcoreconfigfs: Add length check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the targetlugpmembersshow() but the tgptgp variant was missed so resolve that here.