AZL-93521

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page

nvmetexecutediscgetlogpage() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmetcopytosgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check:

u64 offset      = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd);  /* 64-bit host */
size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd);     /* 32-bit host */
...
if (offset & 0x3) { ... }                               /* only check */
...
alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);

The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmethostallowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloclen reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panicon_oops=1) the target host instead.

The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmetcopytosgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKEROFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmetexecutediscgetlog_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer.

Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmetexecutegetlogchanged_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.