AZL-97053

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment

veth exposes non-linear skb fragments through an xdpbuff. If an XDP program adjusts the fragment area, vethxdprcvskb() copies xdpfragssize back to skb->data_len but leaves skb->len containing the old fragment contribution.

After a fragment shrink, this makes skb_headlen() larger than the actual linear area. In the reproduced UDP receive path, __skbdatagramiter() copied 1024 bytes past the actual linear tail to userspace, starting at struct skbsharedinfo. The copied bytes included the affected skb's nrfrags, xdpfragssize, and a kernel pointer from skbshinfo(skb)->frags[0]. Real packet data was displaced by the same amount and truncated at the end.

Subtract the old datalen before replacing it and add the new datalen afterwards, keeping skb->len and skb->data_len synchronized.

Additionally, bpfxdppulldata() can advance dataend while leaving frags present. The skb is then still non-linear, so the old _skbput(skb, off) triggers SKBLINEARASSERT().

Use skbsettailpointer() and update skb->len explicitly instead, following bpfprogrungeneric_xdp(). Unlike __skbput(), skbsettailpointer() does not require a linear skb.

A 60000-byte UDP datagram on a veth pair with MTU 64000 was shortened by 1024 bytes from its fragment area. Before the fix, all 10 runs produced corrupted payloads. After the fix, all 10 runs matched the expected payload exactly. A forced-tailroom reproducer also exercises bpfxdppulldata() with frags still present; the old code triggers SKBLINEAR_ASSERT(), while this fix passes 10/10 runs.