AZL-99467

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak

fdpncii2cread() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied bytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the i2cmasterrecv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious, counterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can drive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that clobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size (directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip and the next length read run past a short receive. Reject a length outside [FDPNCII2CMINPAYLOAD, FDPNCII2CMAX_PAYLOAD], as a corrupted packet already is, and force resynchronization.

The same loop allocates one data skb per iteration and assumes a length packet followed by a data packet; a device that sends two data packets in one call leaks the first skb when the second allocation overwrites it. Free a previously allocated skb before allocating the next.