AZL-99507

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors

nciextractactivationparamsisodep() and nciextractactivationparamsnfcdep() read an inner length byte from the NCI RFINTFACTIVATEDNTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated activationparamslen. A crafted NCI notification with activationparams_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or 50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb.

The sibling nciextractrfparams*() family was given equivalent protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter extractors were not updated at that time.

Add a datalen parameter to both functions, guard against an empty region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activationparams_len, which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.