CVE-2026-53802: arbitrary file read via symlinked operator-supplied input
paths because --filter merge files (including per-directory merges and -C
.cvsignore), --files-from/--include-from/--exclude-from and the
--password-file / daemon secrets file were opened by path, letting a planted
symlink feed an arbitrary file to the filter parser or the authentication
response; these now use the same ownership-checked path walk
CVE-2026-53803: arbitrary file write via symlinked operator-supplied output
paths because --log-file, --write-batch/--read-batch and the daemon motd,
lock and --config opens resolved by path, letting a planted symlink redirect
a privileged write; these now use the same ownership-checked path walk, and
--read-batch additionally requires a regular file or a FIFO
Note: the ownership-checked path walk opens each intermediate directory
for reading, where plain path resolution needed only search permission,
so an operator path under a search-only (e.g. 0711) ancestor that the
caller cannot read is now refused: --log-file falls back to syslog with
a warning and --exclude-from fails. This matches upstream behaviour.