libcurl's function
curl_easy_duphandle()
has a bug that can lead to libcurl eventually sending off sensitive data that
was not intended for sending.
When doing an HTTP POST transfer with libcurl, you can use the
CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS
option to specify a memory area holding the data to
send to the remote server. The memory area's size is set with a separate
option, for example CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE
.
As the name implies, the data in the specified buffer is copied to a privately held memory buffer that libcurl allocates on the heap. The memory area is associated with the common CURL handle, often referred to as an "easy handle".
This handle can be duplicated by an application to create an identical copy, and all the already set options and data is then also similarly cloned and are be associated with the newly returned handle. This also includes the data to send in an HTTP POST request.
The internal libcurl function that duplicates options from the old handle to the new had two problems:
It mistakenly treated the post data buffer as if it was a C string which is
assumed to end with a zero byte. strdup()
was subsequently used to
duplicate the post data buffer, and as a post data buffer can both
legitimately contain a zero byte, or may not contain any zero bytes at all
(including a tailing one), strdup()
could create a copy that a) was too
small b) was too large or c) could crash due to reading an inaccessible
memory area. The strdup()
function of course allocates memory off the
heap.
After duplication of the handle data, the pointer used to read from when sending the data was not updated. When sending off the post, libcurl would still read from the original handle's buffer which at that time could have been freed or reused for other purposes.
When libcurl subsequently constructs the HTTP POST request and includes data for the protocol body it copies data from that pointer using the old size and the old pointer. This makes a read from the wrong place and can lead to libcurl inserting data into the request that happens to be stored at that places in memory at that time.
We are not aware of anyone having been able to actually exploit this for nefarious purposes, but we cannot exclude that it is possible or even might already have been exploited.