Another race in XENMAPSPACEgranttable handling Guests are permitted access to certain Xen-owned pages of memory. The majority of such pages remain allocated / associated with a guest for its entire lifetime. Grant table v2 status pages, however, are de-allocated when a guest switches (back) from v2 to v1. Freeing such pages requires that the hypervisor enforce that no parallel request can result in the addition of a mapping of such a page to a guest. That enforcement was missing, allowing guests to retain access to pages that were freed and perhaps re-used for other purposes. Unfortunately, when XSA-379 was being prepared, this similar issue was not noticed.
[
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "11.0"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "33"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "34"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "35"
}
]
}
]
"https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2021-28701.json"