An issue was discovered in Suricata before 6.0.4. It is possible to bypass/evade any HTTP-based signature by faking an RST TCP packet with random TCP options of the md5header from the client side. After the three-way handshake, it's possible to inject an RST ACK with a random TCP md5header option. Then, the client can send an HTTP GET request with a forbidden URL. The server will ignore the RST ACK and send the response HTTP packet for the client's request. These packets will not trigger a Suricata reject action.
[
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "9.0"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "10.0"
}
]
},
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "11.0"
}
]
}
]
"https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2021-45098.json"