In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ngene: Fix out-of-bounds bug in ngenecommandconfigfreebuf()
Fix an 11-year old bug in ngenecommandconfigfreebuf() while addressing the following warnings caught with -Warray-bounds:
arch/alpha/include/asm/string.h:22:16: warning: 'builtinmemcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds] arch/x86/include/asm/string32.h:182:25: warning: 'builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds]
The problem is that the original code is trying to copy 6 bytes of data into a one-byte size member config of the wrong structue FWCONFIGUREBUFFERS, in a single call to memcpy(). This causes a legitimate compiler warning because memcpy() overruns the length of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config. It seems that the right structure is FWCONFIGUREFREEBUFFERS, instead, because it contains 6 more members apart from the header _hdr. Also, the name of the function ngenecommandconfigfreebuf() suggests that the actual intention is to ConfigureFreeBuffers, instead of ConfigureBuffers (which takes place in the function ngenecommandconfig_buf(), above).
Fix this by enclosing those 6 members of struct FWCONFIGUREFREE_BUFFERS into new struct config, and use &com.cmd.ConfigureFreeBuffers.config as the destination address, instead of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config, when calling memcpy().
This also helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy().