CVE-2021-47465

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idlekvmstart_guest()

In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in C") kvmstartguest() became idlekvmstart_guest(). The old code allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's frame.

idlekvmstart_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller frame on the emergency stack.

The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:

pacaptrs[i]->emergencysp = allocstack(limit, i) + THREADSIZE;

So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an initial frame that is ready to use.

idlekvmstart_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the emergency stack allocation.

The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248 bytes above the emergency stack allocation.

In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations, either another CPUs mcemergencysp or an IRQ stack. See the order of calls to irqstackearlyinit() and emergencystackinit().

The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essentially never happens in practice - and if it did there's a high likelyhood we'd crash due to that stack overflowing.

Still, we shouldn't be corrupting someone else's stack, and it is purely luck that we aren't corrupting something else.

To fix it we save CR/LR into the caller's frame using the existing r1 on entry, we then create a SWITCHFRAMESIZE frame (which has space for pt_regs) on the emergency stack with the backchain pointing to the existing stack, and then finally we switch to the new frame on the emergency stack.