vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.11.1, vllm has a critical remote code execution vector in a config class named Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config. When vllm loads a model config that contains an auto_map entry, the config class resolves that mapping with get_class_from_dynamic_module(...) and immediately instantiates the returned class. This fetches and executes Python from the remote repository referenced in the auto_map string. Crucially, this happens even when the caller explicitly sets trust_remote_code=False in vllm.transformers_utils.config.get_config. In practice, an attacker can publish a benign-looking frontend repo whose config.json points via auto_map to a separate malicious backend repo; loading the frontend will silently run the backend’s code on the victim host. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.11.1.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/66xxx/CVE-2025-66448.json"
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:vllm:vllm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.1"
}
],
"source": [
"CPE_RANGE",
"REFERENCES"
]
}