The Gitea OpenID association callback in the security settings accepted a positive OpenID 2.0 assertion without checking that the signed-in user had started the linking. Because OpenID 2.0 allows unsolicited assertions, an attacker-controlled OpenID provider could attach the attacker's identity to the account of a signed-in victim who opened a crafted link, and the attacker could then sign in as the victim through OpenID login, which does not apply the local TOTP or WebAuthn checks. The callback now requires a time-limited state value bound to the user.
{
"cna_assigner": "Gitea",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-352"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/104xxx/CVE-2026-104627.json"
}