The asynchronous Smile parser (NonBlockingByteArrayParser) uses a raw-binary length prefix taken from untrusted input to allocate a byte[] before the body is read, with no upper bound and no overflow check. On the raw-binary marker 0xFD, _decodeVInt() computes (value << 6) + (i & 0x3F) without the (value >>> 25) != 0 overflow guard present in the blocking SmileParser._readUnsignedVInt, and _startRawBinary then allocates the declared length immediately.
A Smile feed of roughly ten bytes can therefore force an eager allocation of approximately 2 GB, producing an OutOfMemoryError on reactive or asynchronous Smile endpoints. A VInt crafted to overflow int yields a negative length and a NegativeArraySizeException, a RuntimeException that is not a JacksonException and so escapes the parser contract. Either outcome crashes the request or processing thread.
This is the same class of issue as CVE-2020-28491 in the CBOR parser of this library, which was fixed with a LONGEST_NON_CHUNKED_BINARY guard; the asynchronous Smile parser never received the equivalent guard. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
{
"cna_assigner": "HeroDevs",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-789"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/104xxx/CVE-2026-104895.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.12"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.8"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "2.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.4"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.8"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.4"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}