Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator.
The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces).
On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure.
The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").
{
"cna_assigner": "zephyr",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/10xxx/CVE-2026-10657.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "1.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.1"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "4.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.2"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "448a21da12c9ea28f7fd12c6894e03a987b17a27"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}