Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.
The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-113"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/112xxx/CVE-2026-112880.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
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{
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"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
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{
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"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
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{
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"range": [
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],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
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"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
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{
"range": [
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"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
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]
}