draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/114xxx/CVE-2026-114606.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "31.4.4"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "9c933514b8bcc90a91d88c685525a8885de4027e"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"original_tag": "v31.4.4",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "7bc3d0903103dc9c2115401736447676aa4a2ac3"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}