Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/118xxx/CVE-2026-118265.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.1"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaae"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"original_tag": "v5.4.1",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "a6a9673a54d2c719ceb32ce6a929d35483acfb2b"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}