Open redirect in pgAdmin 4's multi-factor authentication flow. The MFA validate and register endpoints honoured the user-supplied 'next' query/form parameter without confirming the target pointed back inside pgAdmin, so an authenticated victim who clicked /mfa/validate?next= -- a link typically delivered by phishing -- would be sent to an attacker-controlled host directly out of the trusted auth flow.
The defect is a trusted-domain redirect, not a privilege bypass: the attacker gains no read/write access to pgAdmin or the victim's database, but the redirect launders the attacker's destination through pgAdmin's URL, which raises the success rate of credential-phishing follow-on against the victim.
Fix introduces a same-origin _is_safe_redirect_url helper and gates every MFA redirect that consumes user-supplied 'next' values through it. The helper allows only relative paths and absolute URLs whose scheme is http(s) and whose host matches the current request host; it rejects external hosts in absolute and protocol-relative form, non-http schemes (javascript:, data:, mailto:), userinfo tricks (http://localhost@attacker/), and backslash variants that some browsers normalize to forward slashes. Unsafe targets fall back to the internal browser index. A dedicated regression test exercises each accept/reject category and the original reporter PoC.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16.
{
"cna_assigner": "PostgreSQL",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/12xxx/CVE-2026-12049.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:pgadmin:pgadmin_4:*:*:*:*:*:postgresql:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.16"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "fff6a481854b07822c2b54e8181e6a9076d204cd"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}