An integer underflow in Zephyr's IPv4 option handling allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to read stack memory. When replying to an ICMP Echo Request that carries an IPv4 Record Route or Timestamp option, icmpv4_update_record_route() and icmpv4_update_time_stamp() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c compute the length of the already recorded data as ptr - ptr_offset in uint8_t arithmetic. The attacker-controlled Pointer field is checked against the option length but not against the RFC 791 minimum (4 for Record Route, 5 for Timestamp), so a smaller value wraps the length to up to 252 bytes. net_pkt_write() then reads past the 40-byte opt_data stack buffer and up to 213 bytes of stack memory, which can include stack and heap pointers, are returned in the ICMP Echo Reply. A single packet triggers the leak and the device does not crash, so it can be repeated. Devices built with CONFIG_NET_IPV4_HDR_OPTIONS, which CONFIG_NET_IPV4_IGMP selects, are affected.
{
"cna_assigner": "zephyr",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-191",
"CWE-200"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/126xxx/CVE-2026-126957.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "*"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.4.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}