In the nrfconnect/ncs-zigbee repository, the GitHub Actions workflow .github/workflows/build_documentation.yml used the pull_request_target trigger while checking out and executing untrusted pull request code. This allowed a pull request from a fork to run attacker-controlled code in the base repository context with a write-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN (contents: write, pages: write, pull-requests: write), enabling remote code execution in CI, token exfiltration, and unauthorized modification of repository content and GitHub Pages. The workflow was disabled and then rewritten to remove the issue.
{
"cna_assigner": "YesWeHack",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-829"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/129xxx/CVE-2026-129840.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "main branch from commit 163246b7be03c4ad2e88860a437ca827810d73cc (2026-01-15) until the fix in pull request #76 (2026-01-21)"
},
{
"last_affected": "main branch from commit 163246b7be03c4ad2e88860a437ca827810d73cc (2026-01-15) until the fix in pull request #76 (2026-01-21)"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandaloneSingleVersion"
}
]
}
]
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "163246b7be03c4ad2e88860a437ca827810d73cc"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}