Koko Analytics is an open-source analytics plugin for WordPress. Versions prior to 2.1.3 are vulnerable to arbitrary SQL execution through unescaped analytics export/import and permissive admin SQL import. Unauthenticated visitors can submit arbitrary path (pa) and referrer (r) values to the public tracking endpoint in src/Resources/functions/collect.php, which stores those strings verbatim in the analytics tables. The admin export logic in src/Admin/Data_Export.php writes these stored values directly into SQL INSERT statements without escaping. A crafted path such as "),('999','x');DROP TABLE wp_users;-- breaks out of the value list. When an administrator later imports that export file, the import handler in src/Admin/Data_Import.php reads the uploaded SQL with file_get_contents, performs only a superficial header check, splits on semicolons, and executes each statement via $wpdb->query with no validation of table names or statement types. Additionally, any authenticated user with manage_koko_analytics can upload an arbitrary .sql file and have it executed in the same permissive way. Combined, attacker-controlled input flows from the tracking endpoint into exported SQL and through the import execution sink, or directly via malicious uploads, enabling arbitrary SQL execution. In a worst-case scenario, attackers can achieve arbitrary SQL execution on the WordPress database, allowing deletion of core tables (e.g., wp_users), insertion of backdoor administrator accounts, or other destructive/privilege-escalating actions. Version 2.1.3 patches the issue.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/22xxx/CVE-2026-22850.json"
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:ibericode:koko_analytics:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.3"
}
],
"source": [
"CPE_RANGE",
"REFERENCES"
]
}