Tinyproxy through 1.11.3 is vulnerable to HTTP request parsing desynchronization due to a case-sensitive comparison of the Transfer-Encoding header in src/reqs.c. The ischunkedtransfer() function uses strcmp() to compare the header value against "chunked", even though RFC 7230 specifies that transfer-coding names are case-insensitive. By sending a request with Transfer-Encoding: Chunked, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause Tinyproxy to misinterpret the request as having no body. In this state, Tinyproxy sets contentlength.client to -1, skips pullclientdatachunked(), forwards request headers upstream, and transitions into relay_connection() raw TCP forwarding while unread body data remains buffered. This leads to inconsistent request state between Tinyproxy and backend servers. RFC-compliant backends (e.g., Node.js, Nginx) will continue waiting for chunked body data, causing connections to hang indefinitely. This behavior enables application-level denial of service through backend worker exhaustion. Additionally, in deployments where Tinyproxy is used for request-body inspection, filtering, or security enforcement, the unread body may be forwarded without proper inspection, resulting in potential security control bypass.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/31xxx/CVE-2026-31842.json",
"cna_assigner": "TuranSec",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-444"
]
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:tinyproxy_project:tinyproxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.11.3"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"CPE_RANGE"
]
}