Missing required cryptographic step in the TLS 1.3 client HelloRetryRequest handshake logic in wolfSSL could lead to a compromise in the confidentiality of TLS-protected communications via a crafted HelloRetryRequest followed by a ServerHello message that omits the required key_share extension, resulting in derivation of predictable traffic secrets from (EC)DHE shared secret. This issue does not affect the client's authentication of the server during TLS handshakes.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/3xxx/CVE-2026-3230.json",
"cna_assigner": "wolfSSL"
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.9.0"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"CPE_RANGE"
]
}