Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion.
The chunked clause of 'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket':readdata/2 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex ignores the caller-supplied :length option when reading HTTP/1 chunked request bodies. Instead of capping the accumulated body at the configured limit (e.g. Plug.Parsers' default 8 MB), doreadchunkeddata!/5 buffers every received chunk into an iolist unconditionally and materializes the entire body as a single binary. The function always returns {:ok, body, ...}, so callers cannot interpose a 413 response.
Because Plug.Parsers runs before routing and authentication in the standard Phoenix endpoint, an unauthenticated attacker needs no valid route or credentials. Sending a single Transfer-Encoding: chunked POST request with an arbitrarily large body to any path causes the BEAM process to exhaust available memory and be terminated by the OS OOM killer.
The content-length path in the same function correctly enforces the limit and is not affected.
This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.1.
{
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "903e209a521bc216b9f9065c01ae9a0cac2d5a10"
},
{
"fixed": "ae3520dfdbfab115c638f8c7f6f6b805db34e1ab"
}
]
}
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/39xxx/CVE-2026-39803.json",
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
]
}