n8n-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with comprehensive access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to 2.47.4, an authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in n8n-mcp allows a caller holding a valid AUTHTOKEN to cause the server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs supplied through multi-tenant HTTP headers. Response bodies are reflected back through JSON-RPC, so an attacker can read the contents of any URL the server can reach — including cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), internal network services, and any other host the server process has network access to. The primary at-risk deployments are multi-tenant HTTP installations where more than one operator can present a valid AUTHTOKEN, or where a token is shared with less-trusted clients. Single-tenant stdio deployments and HTTP deployments without multi-tenant headers are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.47.4.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/39xxx/CVE-2026-39974.json",
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
]
}{
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"CPE_RANGE",
"REFERENCES"
],
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:n8n-mcp:n8n-mcp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.47.4"
}
]
}