PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUBTOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONSRUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-829"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/40xxx/CVE-2026-40313.json",
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M"
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:praison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.140"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"CPE_RANGE"
]
}