free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the nnef-pfdmanagement route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can use a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token) to read PFD application data via GET /applications and GET /applications/{appID}, and to create or delete PFD change-notification subscriptions via POST /subscriptions and DELETE /subscriptions/{subID}. Same root cause as the other NEF SBI findings: the route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware. Unlike the OAM and traffic-influence groups, nnef-pfdmanagement IS declared in the runtime ServiceList, so this is the production-intended path that operators expect to be protected by OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true -- and it is not. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/44xxx/CVE-2026-44330.json",
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M"
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:free5gc:free5gc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.2"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"CPE_RANGE"
]
}