PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.37, the _safe_extractall helper that all recipe pull, recipe publish, and recipe unpack flows route through validates each archive member's name for absolute paths, .. segments, and resolved-path escape — but does not validate member.linkname, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls tar.extractall(dest_dir) without filter="data". A bundle that contains a symlink with a name inside dest_dir but a linkname pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses through the just-created symlink, escapes dest_dir and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.37.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/44xxx/CVE-2026-44340.json"
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:praison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.37"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"CPE_RANGE"
]
}