OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check. When an attacker sends a Content-Length value that overflows unsigned int (e.g., 4294967296), the framing layer computes a wrapped-around value (e.g., 0) and splits the TCP stream at the wrong boundary, causing the body of the first SIP message to be processed as a separate message and enabling SIP message smuggling. Because Content-Length is parsed in the transport layer before authentication, an unauthenticated, network-based attacker can smuggle arbitrary SIP messages over any TCP-based transport (prototcp, prototls, protows, protowss) on any instance with TCP enabled, with no routing-script preconditions. This allows smuggled messages to bypass front-end SBC/proxy security policies, inherit the connection's authentication context, and evade rate limiting. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/45xxx/CVE-2026-45103.json",
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "3.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.6"
},
{
"introduced": "4.0.0-beta"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0-rc1"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"REFERENCES"
]
}