azureidentity.Validate() verifies that the PKCS#7 signer certificate chains to a trusted Azure CA but never verifies the PKCS#7 signature itself. An attacker can embed a legitimate Azure certificate alongside arbitrary content e.g. {"vmId":"<target>"} and the forged vmId will be accepted returning the victim workspace agent's session token.
No authentication is required. The attacker only needs to know a target VM's vmId which is a UUIDv4.
that's a practical limitation which would typically require prior access to be exploited
In unpatched Coder releases the signature over the PKCS#7 content is not validated - only the signing certificate is checked.
An attacker on any Azure VM or with access to a publicly available Azure IMDS certificate from CT logs can:
POST /api/v2/workspaceagents/azure-instance-identity which is unauthenticated.GET /workspaceagents/me/gitsshkey: push to repositories and impersonate the workspace owner.GET /workspaceagents/me/external-auth: GitHub, GitLab, and Bitbucket tokens in plaintext.<img width="5588" height="4176" alt="PKCS7_diagram (1)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74e88a89-a995-450d-87ab-6feed03579a5" />
All versions of Coder v2 are affected.
Fixed in #25286
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
| Patched Versions | | --- | | v2.33.3 | | v2.32.2 | | v2.31.12 | | v2.30.8 | | v2.29.13 | | v2.24.5 |
If unable to patch we recommend immediately reconfiguring any Azure templates to use token authentication rather than azure-instance-identity until the patch is released and you are fully upgraded.
coder_agent.auth value to be token.CODER_AGENT_TOKEN=${coder_agent.main.token} to the set of environment variables for the Coder Workspace Agent initialization script.We'd like to thank Ben Tran of calif.io and Anthropic’s Security Team (ANT-2026-22445) for independently disclosing this issue!
{
"severity": "CRITICAL",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T20:04:13Z"
}