The shared-view password check fell back to strict-equality (===) comparison for
legacy plaintext passwords, leaking the password's length and per-character prefix
through response timing.
The bcrypt branch (hashes starting with $2a$/$2b$) was unaffected. The legacy
fallback in View.ts now uses crypto.timingSafeEqual and a same-length dummy
compare on the length-mismatch path, so total comparison time is approximately
length-independent. The EE dashboard model's verifyPassword is patched the same way.
A network-positioned attacker could mount a timing oracle against shared views whose passwords predated the bcrypt migration. Exploitation requires the ability to time shared-view authentication responses but no prior authentication.
This issue was reported by @Proscan-one.
{
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-203"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:03:33Z"
}