Sign-in response timing differed between known and unknown email addresses because the unknown-user branch returned without performing a password hash comparison.
The unknown-user branch in auth.service.ts now performs a bcrypt.compare against
a fixed dummy hash so the response time of failed sign-ins is approximately
independent of whether the address exists. Rate limiting on the sign-in endpoint is
implemented in the Enterprise build only and is not affected by this advisory.
A network-positioned attacker could enumerate registered email addresses by timing sign-in responses. Exploitation requires only the ability to send unauthenticated sign-in requests.
This issue was reported by @AndyAnh174.
{
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208",
"CWE-307"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"severity": "LOW",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:03:55Z"
}