GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg

Summary

The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's redirect_url to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirect_url; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].

Details

The vulnerable sink is in packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts:

• isValidRedirectUrl validated only typeof === 'string' and non-empty trim — no scheme check.
• The submit branch built an anchor element, compared anchor.host to window.location.host, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assigned window.location.href = redirectUrl (otherwise).
• For non-network schemes such as javascript:, data:, vbscript:, and file:, anchor.host is the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch — executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.

The redirect_url field is writable by any user with editor role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.

Impact

• Same-origin script execution in the viewer's NocoDB tab. The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].token.
• Action under the viewer's identity. With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.
• Single-click viewer flow. Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.

Credit

This issue was reported by @kah-ja (turingpoint.de).