The serialize() function in hono/cookie validates domain and path options against characters that corrupt Set-Cookie header syntax (;, \r, \n), but does not apply the same validation to sameSite and priority. An application that passes user-controlled input into either option may produce a Set-Cookie response header containing attacker-chosen additional attributes.
When constructing a Set-Cookie header value, serialize() appends the sameSite and priority option values directly into the output string after a presentation-only transformation (capitalizing the first character). Although the TypeScript type signature constrains these options to specific string literals, that constraint is not enforced at runtime; any string value, including one containing ; or line-feed characters, passes through unchanged.
The validation guard that rejects ;, \r, and \n from domain and path is not applied to sameSite or priority. An application that passes a request-derived value to either option therefore provides an injection point into the header line.
This issue arises when an application passes user-controlled input to the sameSite or priority option of setCookie() or serialize().
An attacker who can control the sameSite or priority option value may inject additional attributes into a Set-Cookie response header.
This may lead to:
Domain, Path, HttpOnly, Secure, or Max-Age for the affected cookieSet-Cookie header in the same responseThis issue affects applications that pass user-derived input into the sameSite or priority option of hono/cookie serialization functions.
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T17:16:32Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-113",
"CWE-1287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T17:59:25Z"
}