Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-347"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/49xxx/CVE-2026-49454.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "2e456897af3158c175bb490ce7fc51d6241c8922"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "8910200"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}