CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon through 2.19.0 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP ASPATH mask matching implementation in nest/a-path.c. The aspathmatch() function uses a fixed-size stack array of 2048 + 1 pmpos entries, while parsepath() expands ASPATH segments from a received BGP UPDATE without enforcing a corresponding capacity limit. When RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages are enabled and a BIRD filter evaluates an AS path mask expression such as "bgppath ~ [= ... =]", an established BGP peer can send a long ASPATH containing more than 2048 expanded ASNs. This causes parsepath()/aspath_match() to write beyond the fixed stack buffer, resulting in a crash of the daemon. NOTE: reportedly, the Supplier's position is that a fix is not being prioritized because all network operators should already be rejecting routes with unusually long attributes.
{
"cna_assigner": "mitre",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-121"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/49xxx/CVE-2026-49943.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.19.0"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"DESCRIPTION"
]
}