The CSV user import in update mode bypasses user-edit authorization. A user with only the import permission can overwrite any non-admin user's email by uploading a CSV, then trigger a password reset to take over the account.
UserImporter.php checks the canEditAuthFields gate and tries to strip auth fields from the model:
// app/Importer/UserImporter.php:107-114
if (Auth::check() && (! Gate::allows('canEditAuthFields', $user))) {
unset($user->username);
unset($user->email);
unset($user->password);
unset($user->activated);
}
$user->update($this->sanitizeItemForUpdating($user));
The unset()s operate on the model, but sanitizeItemForUpdating() rebuilds its array from $this->item (the raw CSV row), not from the model:
// app/Importer/ItemImporter.php:135-149
protected function sanitizeItemForStoring($model, $updating = false)
{
$item = collect($this->item); // CSV data, not model attributes
$item = $item->only($model->getFillable());
if ($updating) {
$item = $item->reject(fn($v) => empty($v));
}
return $item->toArray();
}
The attacker's CSV values pass through untouched.
For non-admin attacker vs. non-admin, non-superuser target, the gate returns true at AuthServiceProvider.php:137, so the unset() block never executes. The entire import path checks only $this->authorize('import') (ImportController.php:196); no users.edit check anywhere. The normal API route PATCH /api/v1/users/{id} correctly returns 403 for the same user.
Attacker must have import privileges to exploit this, and that permission must be granted specifically and intentionally by a superadmin.
Patched in v8.6.0
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T23:02:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null
}