BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, in the official apps/epics client tool on v1.6.0-rc1 (not in the generic BACnet RPM ACK decoder alone) a malicious BACnet/IP endpoint can reply to the EPICS tool’s legitimate ReadPropertyMultiple request with a syntactically valid ReadPropertyMultiple-ACK that contains more heading properties than the tool’s fixed local storage can hold. The response is decoded successfully and later consumed by ProcessRPMData(), which writes property values into a fixed global array using an unbounded linear index. This results in a reproducible global-buffer-overflow in apps/epics/main.c. This is a network-reachable memory corruption in the official epics tool’s response-processing path. The root cause is that apps/epics treats a remotely supplied variable-length RPM property list as if it were a trusted, fixed-size local heading-property set. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129",
"CWE-787"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/52xxx/CVE-2026-52786.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.5"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.1"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
}
]
}