Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.
Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.
This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53424.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "*"
},
{
"introduced": "8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c"
},
{
"fixed": "*"
},
{
"introduced": "8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c"
},
{
"fixed": "*"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}
]
}