OAuth access and refresh tokens were not revoked when the user changed, reset, or recovered their password, leaving an attacker-issued OAuth grant valid after the user believed they had locked the attacker out.
revokeAllOAuthTokensByUser in the users service was an empty stub being called from
passwordChange, passwordForgot, and passwordReset. It now delegates to
OAuthToken.revokeAllByUser(userId), which deletes the rows and invalidates the
related auth caches. All three reset/recovery flows now consistently revoke refresh
tokens (GHSA-r989-7g3j-wjhw), OAuth tokens (this advisory), and rotate
token_version.
Persistent unauthorized access through previously issued OAuth tokens after a documented security event (password change, forgot, or reset).
This issue was reported by @bugbunny-research.
{
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:43:09Z"
}