Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53942.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}