Daytona's organization role update and delete endpoints authorized the caller as an owner of the organization named in the request path, but resolved and mutated the target role by its identifier alone, without verifying the role belonged to that organization. An authenticated user who owns any organization (organizations are self-service) could therefore modify the permissions of, or delete, a role belonging to a different organization, given that role's identifier.
This is a cross-tenant broken access control (IDOR) issue affecting multi-tenant deployments, including the managed Daytona platform. Using a target role's identifier, an attacker with owner rights over their own organization could:
Exploitation requires knowledge of the target role's identifier, which is not enumerable across organizations and is not exposed to non-members through the API.
All versions up to and including 0.184.0.
Fixed in 0.185.0. The role update, delete, and role-assignment lookups are now scoped to the caller's organization, so a role belonging to another organization resolves to "not found" before any read or mutation. The managed Daytona platform was updated on release of 0.185.0.
None. Upgrade to 0.185.0. Single-organization self-hosted deployments are not exploitable, as the issue requires a second organization to target.
Reported by @vnth4nhnt.
{
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T21:30:08Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"severity": "HIGH",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
]
}