In wolfSSL, ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 reuse an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record. Because wcAriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the MagicCrypto SDK with no internal counter, and because the explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This vulnerability affects wolfSSL builds configured with --enable-aria and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK (a non-default, opt-in configuration required for Korean regulatory deployments). AES-GCM is not affected because wcAesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an internal invocation counter independently of the call-site guard.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-323"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/5xxx/CVE-2026-5446.json",
"cna_assigner": "wolfSSL"
}