Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54542.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
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{
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"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
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{
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"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
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